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Kadeem Noray* (knoray@hillsdale.edu), 10 E. Fayette Street, Hillsdale, MI 49242. *Political
Corruption and Public Advocacy: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis*. Preliminary report.

We consider a two population evolutionary game that models the role of public advocacy as a deterrent to political corruption. A population of politicians chooses whether or not to engage in corrupt behavior, and a population of citizens decide whether or not to advocate for corruption reform, with the potential to impact detection and punishment levels for corruption. We study the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium structure of this game. We also conduct an evolutionary analysis, finding evolutionary stable strategies and studying the evolution of strategies over time via the replicator dynamics for a two population game. (Received January 15, 2015)